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Abstract—Sharing data from various sources and of diverse
kinds, and fusing them together for sophisticated analytics and
mash-up applications are emerging trends, and are prerequisites
for grand visions such as that of cyber-physical systems enabled
smart cities. Cloud infrastructure can enable such data sharing
both because it can scale easily to an arbitrary volume of data
and computation needs on demand, as well as because of natural
collocation of diverse such data sets within the infrastructure.
However, in order to convince data owners that their data are
well protected while being shared among cloud users, the cloud
platform needs to provide flexible mechanisms for the users to
express the constraints (access rules) subject to which the data
should be shared, and likewise, enforce them effectively. We study
a comprehensive set of practical scenarios where data sharing
needs to be enforced by methods such as aggregation, windowed
frame, value constrains, etc., and observe that existing basic
access control mechanisms do not provide adequate flexibility to
enable effective data sharing in a secure and controlled manner.
In this paper, we thus propose a framework for cloud that extends
popular XACML model significantly by integrating flexible access
control decisions and data access in a seamless fashion. We
have prototyped the framework and deployed it on commercial
cloud environment for experimental runs to test the efficacy of
our approach and evaluate the performance of the implemented
prototype.
Keywords: cloud computing, access control, flexible shar-
ing, fine-grained policies, XACML
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cloud computing in recent years is rapidly
changing the way businesses and government agencies, as well
as individuals, are storing and managing their data as well as
workflows. Instead of developing and maintaining individual
data management infrastructures and data sharing mechanisms,
data owners now leverage on the cloud services to make their
data available to users. The fact that data from multiple sources
now reside in one logical place, i.e., the cloud, makes it much
easier than ever before to develop large scale applications
that require data and knowledge from multiple domains and
sources. These applications could include environmental study,
city infrastructure planning, disaster monitoring, and many
more. In an era when the cloud infrastructure was non-existent,
to develop such applications, the developer would have to
first talk to individual data owners to specifically provide the
data to them, which is likely to involve tedious administration
procedures such as signing documents regarding the privileges
and responsibilities of each parties, apart from the cumbersome
process of actually shipping the data. Then the developer
would have to develop software that work with the individ-
ual data exchange interfaces/protocols provided by different
owners to collect and reformat the data before they could be
fed into the applications for analysis or real-time monitoring
tasks.
On the multitenant cloud, such data from diverse sources are
naturally collocated, making it much easier and much more
efficient for the application developers to obtain what they
need for their work. More specifically, the storage and data ex-
change can be handled efficiently by the cloud providers. This
means data owners need not worry about how to share, but
what and who to share. Putting one’s proprietary data online
on the cloud raises concerns regarding data security, privacy
and ownership. Even if the cloud service provider is trusted,
and legally obliged (through service level agreements and law
enforcement) to prevent illegal access of data and information
leakage, there needs to be meaningful, comprehensive and
flexible ways for the data owners to express their sharing
preferences, in a manner which can readily be interpreted and
enforced by the cloud service provider. This paper discusses
how this can be achieved. One can further argue how this can
be realized if the cloud service provider is not even trusted,
but that is an issue outside the scope of this work, and is part
of our future work.
The objective of this work is to propose and showcase a
framework for sharing data on the cloud. The framework,
called eXACML, facilitates sharing in an easy-to-use, secure,
flexible and scalable manner. For security, we make use of/ex-
tend XACML [21] — the XML-based and popular framework
for access control. XACML has become a standard for specify-
ing and enforcing access control policies. It evaluates requests
for resources against a set of policies and returns permit or
deny decision, which does not involve accessing any data. In
eXACML, we extend XACML to support more fine-grained
policies as well as to handle data processing. We demonstrate
eXACML’s flexibility by using it in different access control
scenarios with different levels of granularity. For usability,
eXACML provides an intuitive, easy-to-use interface for data
owners and data users to specify and enforce security policies
and to access shared data. Finally, we carry out experiments to
evaluate the framework performance in a cloud-like environ-
ment, the results of which suggests that eXACML is scalable.
We motivate our work with scenarios from ongoing works on
better city planning, specifically related to weather and traffic
information, and the evaluations are also based on datasets,
part of which are real, while the rest is synthetic.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are as
follows:
1) We demonstrate the needs for secure and flexible data
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2sharing with practical examples involving city planning
and management based on data from weather and traffic
monitoring stations. We discuss scenarios in which ac-
cess control with different levels of granularity of data
access are needed.
2) We extend the XACML framework to support fine-
grained policies. In particular, fine-grain access control
policies (which require data filtering) are expressed
within obligations that are passed from the Policy Deci-
sion Point (PDP) to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP),
which connects to the database and processes the data
queries embedded in the obligations. We refer to this
implementation as
XACML*. We discuss why this approach could perform
better than the traditional approach based on views.
3) We implement a prototype of the framework
(eXACML), providing additionally, an easy-to-use user
interface. The prototype allows data owners to easily add
and modify their policies. Data users can query meta
data and details of access policies at remote servers.
They can also specify aggregated data from multiple
sources in single requests. Responses to data requests
contain information of matching policies, enabling flex-
ible conflict resolutions.
4) We evaluate the performance of our prototype in cloud-
like settings. Our experiments illustrate that the frame-
work incurs low overhead. We attribute this scalability to
the framework’s ability to cache responses and perform
aggregation of responses from multiple sources prior to
returning them to the data users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes practical scenarios that motivates our framework.
Section 3 details our extensions to XACML, followed by the
logical design of our framework in Section 4. The prototype
and its evaluation are presented in Section 5. We discuss
related and future works in Section 6 and Section 7 and
conclude in Section 8.
Before proceeding further, we’ll like to make a final note
on the scope of the current work and implementation. Broadly
speaking, there are two kinds of data - data already stored
in the system (which we refer to as archived/archival data),
and data stream, where live data is flowing into the system.
Likewise, the queries could be ‘on demand’, typically on the
stored data, or continuous queries, to be evaluated on the
incoming data streams. The current implementation deals with
on demand queries on stored data. This is summarized in Table
I.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
As increasing portion of the world population is rapidly
moving to the cities, while the resources at our disposal
are shrinking at an alarming rate, numerous research and
industrial initiatives (e.g., IBM’s smart cities initiative 1) are
focusing in realizing what are being termed as ‘smart(er)
cities’ in order to manage resources efficiently at the city
1http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/smarter cities/overview/index.
html
scale. Enabling such a move towards smarter cities are cyber-
physical systems aggregating data and actuating the necessary
resource management actions at the edge, while the necessary
data storage and analytics is carried out on cloud based back-
end.
In this section, we use some scenarios of road congestion
analysis to showcase the need among data owners for flexible
data sharing.
A. Settings.
Noticing that one of the major expressways in the city suf-
fers serious congestion during every monsoon season, Singa-
pore’s Land Transport Authority (LTA) has, after preliminary
studies, hypothesized that such congestion is mainly caused
by three factors, (1) large number of vehicles on the road, (2)
slow speed of vehicles, (3) bad weather.
To validate such preliminary conclusions and build a traf-
fic condition model during the monsoon season, researchers
need more data. Fortunately, many organizations have been
collecting related data: LTA itself has a number of sensors
deployed along the road side to record traffic volume, i.e.,
the number of vehicles passing by at unit time; furthermore,
another independent entity, a large local taxi company, collects
the speed and location data from their taxis’ GPS devices. At
almost any time, there are a number of such taxis running over
the whole stretch of the express way. Likewise, the national
environmental agency (NEA) has several weather stations
deployed close to the congested areas, that record weather
parameters such as temperature, humidity, rain rate, etc.
If all these different data owners use a shared cloud infras-
tructure2 to store and process the above mentioned data-sets
for their individual needs, then when complex analytics involv-
ing multiple such datasets become necessary, the data is readily
available on the infrastructure thanks to such collocation on
the multi-tenant cloud.
Suppose the data are stored in relational tables as shown in
Table II for traffic volume information, Table III for cab’s
location and speed information and Table IV for weather
information.
B. Example 1
Suppose that NEA decides to share (possibly for a price)
only the rain rate data with LTA researchers, since other
weather parameters such as temperature and humidity are not
expected to affect traffic condition as much as rainfall does
in the context of Singapore, and hence LTA does not want
pay for the temperature or humidity information. Furthermore,
even if the original collected data available with NEA is for
one minute interval, it may want to expose only the data
corresponding to five minute averages to LTA. It may also
expose the more detailed data to its own employees or to other
customers.
The first constraint corresponds to the projection operation
in the relational database model and a sample SQL query will
2Note that we are unaware of the current practice of the individual
organizations mentioned above, and what follows is a hypothetical scenario.
3Query/Database Archival (relational) databases Stream databases
On demand query current implementation n/a
Continuous query n/a Future work
TABLE I: Scope of eXACML, regarding database and query type
SamplingTime TrafficVolume
2011-06-06 10:00:00 60
2011-06-06 10:05:00 67
2011-06-06 10:10:00 50
... ...
TABLE II: Table TrafficInfo: Traffic volume data from road side sensors
SamplingTime Speed (km/hr) latitude longitude
2011-06-06 10:00:00 100 x1 y1
2011-06-06 10:05:00 80 x2 y2
2011-06-06 10:10:00 40 x3 y3
... ...
TABLE III: Table VehicleInfo: Vehicle speed and location data from GPS devices
SamplingTime Temperature(C) Humidity (%) RainRate (mm/hr) ...
2011-06-06 10:00:00 27.2 70 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:01:00 27.5 70 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:02:00 27.5 73 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:03:00 27.4 72 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:04:00 27.3 75 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:05:00 27.3 76 0.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:06:00 27.0 77 0.1 ...
2011-06-06 10:07:00 27.1 80 5.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:08:00 26.8 81 14.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:09:00 26.6 82 20.0 ...
2011-06-06 10:10:00 26.5 85 34.4 ...
... ... ... ... ...
TABLE IV: Table WeatherInfo: Weather data from weather stations
be something like ”select RainRate from WeatherInfo”. The
second constraint can be considered as a sliding window query
over a data stream, i.e., the time series rain rate data. Standard
SQL does not support these kind of queries well, hence
additional operations need to be implemented on top of the
RDBMS query engine. To specify a sliding window query on
a time series data sequence in our scenario, five parameters are
needed, namely, the starting time, ending time, window size,
window advance step and aggregation function. The starting
time and ending time are the general temporal constraints that
specify the segment of the data stream to be returned. The
window size and window advance step decide the length of
the query window and how fast the window is moving along
the data stream. The aggregation function includes numerical
functions such as average(), max(), min(), count(), etc., which
are applied to the data records to summarize the portion of
the data stream within the window.
C. Example 2
Consider that the taxi company agrees to help the re-
searchers by providing their taxis’ location and speed data, but
the company only wants to share such information for taxis
within some specific regions in the vicinity of the congested
areas being studied, instead of exposing the information about
its whole fleet, which it deems important business secret not
to be exposed to third parties. To enforce such a constraint,
a selection operator is applied to the longitude and latitude
columns to filter out those records that are not supposed to be
shared with the researchers. For the sake of simplicity, assume
that this range is specified by a rectangle with the geographical
coordinate of the upper left vertex as (a1,b1) and of the lower
right vertex as (a2,b2), we can have the corresponding SQL
query: select SamplingTime, Speed from VehicleInfo v where
v.longitude => a1 and v.longitude <= a2 and v.latitude >=
b2 and v.latitude <= b1.
To enable the above access contraints in XACML, we make
use of the obligation element in policy element to specify the
constraints. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present two examples of XACML
obligations that embed these constraints. In Figure 4, line 2
indicates that the permission to perform the sliding window
query if the decision returned from PDP is ‘permit’. Line 3
indicates that the aggregation function to be used in the sliding
window query is average calculation. Lines 5 to 8 specify that
starting time is zero o’clock of June 6th, 2011, ending time is
zero o’clock of June 7th, 2011, window size is 5 minutes and
window advance step is also of 5 minutes. Line 9 indicates
that the sliding window is applied on SamplingTime column
as well, besides on the actual rain rate data column, which is
not shown here within the obligation part. Line 3 in Figure 5
shows the selection predicate to be included in the SQL query
to be evaluated on the data table, which only allows vehicle
information to be returned if the vehicle’s location is within a
4given boundary.
D. Fine-grained Policies
The examples above demonstrate real needs for an access
control model that supports fine-grained policies involving
fine-grained data processing. At a high level, the models need
to be able to express and enforce the following types of
policies:
1) Aggregated data: Only results of aggregation functions
over raw data such as average,sum, min, max are shared.
2) Trigger-based: a row of data is accessible only if the
value of a column satisfies a certain predicate: exceeds
a specific threshold, or is contained within a range.
As an example, a taxi company is granted access to
temperature reading only if the temperature is over
30oC.
3) Sliding window: a sliding window is specified by its
starting time, ending time, window size and advance
step. Only aggregated data (average, for instance) over
the windows are accessible.
4) Approximation: only data whose values approximate
those given in the requests are accessible. For example, a
request includes a value X , and the policies is specified
such that a row of data is returned only if the column
c’s value V satisfies |V − X| <  for some distance
function.
We next explore how such fine-grained policies can be
flexibly supported.
III. FLEXIBLE SHARING THROUGH FINE-GRAINED
POLICIES
Existing frameworks, such as XACML, do not natively
support different levels of granularity to support fine-grained
access control. Nevertheless, XACML has emerged in recent
years as a mature and widely used model for expressing
and enforcing access control policies. Therefore, we extend
XACML in order to support fine-grained policies, including
those described in Section 2.
For the rest of this paper, we assume relational databases
(SQL types) are used for managing data in the back-end.
Without loss of generality, but for the purpose of simplicity of
exposition, we consider that each database consists of a single
table indexed by time values. When requesting for data, the
user provides his credentials (for example, name and role) and
specifies the location of data. The response contains either a
deny decision (i.e. no access to the data), or permit decision
together with the returned data as specified in the policies.
A. XACML
XACML is an OASIS framework for specifying and enforc-
ing access control [21]. It is XML based and the latest version
is 3.0. XACML allows administrators to control their resources
by writing policy files, which are then loaded into a Policy
Decision Point (PDP) module. An user wishing to access a
specific resource sends request to a Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) where the decision is made by consulting the PDP.
XACML specifies standards for writing policies, requests and
interpreting the response.
1) Subjects, Resources and Actions. A subject in XACML
has a set of credentials such as its name, role, etc. The
subject wishes to perform certain actions (read, write,
for example) on a set of system resources.
2) Requests. Request for accessing system resources are
written in XML. The subject credentials, system re-
sources and actions are specified in one or more At-
tribute elements included in the Subject, Resource and
Action elements respectively. Fig. 1 shows an example
of an XACML request from a subject with role admin
to perform read action the temperature column from
weather data database.
3) Policies. A policy contains a Target, a set of Rules
each of which has at most one Condition, and a set
of Obligations. Multiple policies can be grouped into
a policy set, which has its own Target element. The
policy is indexed by its Target element, which consists
of a number of conditions needed to be satisfied by the
request before the rest of the policy can be evaluated.
Conditions are essentially boolean expressions over the
values included in the request. The policy returns ac-
cess control decision which is either Permit, Deny, Not
Applicable or Intermediate. The last two are used when
there is no applicable policy or an error occurred during
evaluation. Fig. 2 illustrates an example of an XACML
policy that grants access to subjects with government
role to the samplingtime and temperature columns of
weather data.
When more than one rules are applicable to a par-
ticular request, they are evaluated according to rule
combination algorithm specified in the policy. Similarly,
multiple applicable policies in a policy set are evaluated
according to a specified policy combination algorithm.
Examples of combining algorithms (for both policies
and rules) are Permit-overrides where a permit policy
or rule is evaluated, and First-applicable where the first
applicable policy is evaluated.
4) Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). User requests first go
through the PEP, which translates them into canonical
forms before passing to the PDP. Additionally, PEP also
interprets responses and obligations returned from the
PDP. In summary, PEP deals with application logics
and acts as the access control enforcement mechanism.
Our framework extends PEP to provide support for more
fine-grained policies.
5) Policy Decision Point (PDP). Data owners’ policies are
loaded into the PDP, which evaluates requests received
from the PEP against the active policies. Its main task is
to efficiently find applicable policies for a given request
and to quickly evaluate their rules and conditions to
determine the access control decision. It sends back to
PEP a well-formed response containing a decision and
a set of obligations.
5<Subject>
<Attribute AttributeId = ‘‘exacml:subject:role-id’’
DataType={http://wwww.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string}>
<AttributeValue>admin</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute AttributeId = ‘‘exacml:rdmb-database-id’’
DataType={http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string}>
<AttributeValue>weather_data</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId = ‘‘exacml:rdmb-column-id’’
DataType={http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string}>
<AttributeValue>temperature</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute AttributeId = ‘‘exacml:action-id’’
DataType={http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string}>
<AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Action>
Fig. 1: Example of a well-formed XACML request, in which the user with the role admin requests read access to the column
temperature of the database weather data
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
government
</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="exacml:subject:role-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
weather_data
</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="exacml:rdbms-database-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Resource>
<Resources>
<Actions>
<AnyAction/>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="example" Effect="Permit">
<Target> <Subjects> <AnySubject/> </Subjects>
<Resources> <AnyResource/> </Resources>
<Actions> <AnyAction/> </Actions>
</Target>
<Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-subset">
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="exacml:rdbms-column-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
samplingtime
</AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
temperature
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
Fig. 2: Example of a well-formed XACML policy which grant access to column samplingtime or temperature of the database
weather data to any subject with role goverment
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Fig. 3: Extensions to XACML that support more flexible
access control policies.
B. View-Based vs Obligation-Based
The traditional access control model in relational databases
is based on view [24]. Basically, a view is the result of a
SQL query on existing tables, to which read/write access
are specified. The database management systems maintain the
views and enforce access control rules on them.
A simple approach based on view to support fine-grained
policies with XACML can be realized as follows. First, views
are created with no access control restriction, and assigned
with unique resource IDs. This can handle all types of policies
discussed earlier. PEP maintains a mapping between the IDs
and actual views. Next, the IDs are used to specify the
resources in XACML policies, as well as to construct data
requests. Once PDP returns a permit decision, PEP retrieves
and returns the corresponding views.
However, there are a number of weaknesses with this
approach:
• Views need to be created prior to policies or requests.
They must also be removed explicitly by the data owner.
• Views are static and may be very large in number
(potentially infinite number of views for trigger-based
and sliding window policies). Maintaining these views
are inefficient at best and impossible at worst.
• An user requesting for data must also maintain a mapping
of all the view IDs they wish to access. Not only is such
a requirement undesirable for data users, but also it is
expensive to implement.
Fig. 3 illustrates the obligation-based approach (extensions
to XACML is highlighted in bold). The basic idea is to embed
queries for creating views into obligations. The PEP, upon
receipt of the obligations, executes the embedded queries on
the database and returns the results in a well-formed response.
Unlike the view-based approach, the size of data (views)
maintained by PEP is bounded. Furthermore, popular queries
can be cached by the database management system or the
PEP. In the experiment section, we demonstrate the benefit of
caching in improving request time.
C. Implementations
1) Obligations.: Using obligation-based approach, policy
writers utilize different types of obligations to specify different
database queries. Our current implementation supports four
types of obligations (Table V):
Description ObligationId
Column aggregation exacml:obligation:column-aggregation
Simple selection exacml:obligation:simple-selection
Sliding window exacml:obligation:column-sliding-window
Approximation exacml:obligation:column-approximation
TABLE V: Obligation types
1) Column aggregation: consists of a string attribute with
ID
exacml:obligation:aggregation-id. The string
represents an aggregation function, such as average
(Fig. 4, line 2-3), min, max, count or sum.
2) Simple selection: consists of a string attribute with ID
exacml:obligation:selection-id. The string is a
boolean expression that will be used as the WHERE
clause when constructing the database query. An ex-
ample of this obligation is shown in Fig. 5, in which
the policy restricts access to data to within a certain
geographical region.
3) Sliding window: we assume that the column from which
the sliding windows are based is of type DateTime
(although sliding windows could be constructed from
any other sortable types). The obligation consists of a
number of attributes:
• Sliding window column: string attribute with ID
exacml:obligation:sliding-window-column-id
specifies the column of type DateTime from which
sliding windows are constructed.
• Start and End: time attributes with IDs
exacml:obligation:sliding-window-start-id
and
exacml:obligation:sliding-window-end-id
respectively.
• Window size: integer attribute with ID
exacml:obligation:sliding-window-size-id
specifies the window size (in hours).
• Advance step: integer attribute with ID
exacml:obligation:sliding-window-step-id
specifies how the sliding window advances, i.e.
the number hours between starting time of two
consecutive windows.
Fig. 4 (line 4-10) shows an example of a sliding window
based on SamplingTime column. The window’s size
is 5 hours, starting from 2011-06-06 00:00:00,
advancing in 5-hour steps until 2011-06-07
00:00:00.
4) Approximation: this obligation specifies the acceptable
distance between the column values with respect to
the values included in the request. Attributes containing
column IDs are specified in both the requests and the
policies. Specifically:
• In the request: string attribute with ID
exacml:data-value-id is of the form
<columnId>:<value> which represent the value
of the specified column.
• In the policy: string attribute with ID
exacml:obligation:approximation-param-id
7contains the column IDs. Columns specified in the
requests must be a subset of what is specified in
the policies. Also required is a double attribute
with ID
exacml:obligation:approximation-value-id
which represents the distance between the vector
of column values in the database and that included
in the request.
2) Handling obligations.: PEP extracts attributes embedded
in the obligations and constructs corresponding queries to be
executed on the database. It is not uncommon for a policy
to have more than one types of obligations, which allows for
more expressive, fine-grained conditions for accessing data.
Essentially, PEP creates queries of the following form:
select f(column_1), f(column_2),..,f(column_n)
from Table_name where Where_Condition
(1)
where column_i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and Table_name are
extracted from the Resources element of the request. When
no obligation is returned, f and Where_Condition are set
to empty strings. In this case, the query becomes:
select column_1, column_2,..,column_n
from Table_name
PEP obtains f from the string attribute in the column ag-
gregation obligation. When a simple selection obligation is re-
turned, Where_condition is taken directly from its string
attribute. For approximation obligations, the PEP first retrieves
a vector of values from the request, namely (x1, x2, .., xk)
from columns
c1, c2, .., ck. It then obtains the distance value δ in the obliga-
tion, and sets Where_condition as:
sqrt((c1 − x1).(c1 − x1) + ..+ (ck − xk).(ck − xk)) < δ
Handling sliding-window obligations are more complex.
First, the tuple
(start, end, window size, advancing step) are extracted
from the obligation. The total number of windows are:
nW = bend− start− window size+ 1
advancing step
c+ 1
For every window, PEP creates a different query. More specif-
ically, let c be the column (of type DateTime) from which the
sliding windows are constructed, a query i (0 ≤ i < nW ) is
of the form:
select f(column_1), f(column_2),..,f(column_n)
from Table_name where Where_Condition
AND c ≥ start+step*i
AND c < start+step*i+size
where Where_Condition are constructed from simple
selection and approximation obligations.
IV. THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents our design of the framework that
enables secure, easy-to-use, flexible and scalable data sharing.
The security comes from the use of XACML for specifying
and enforcing access control. The flexibility property is the
result of our enhancement to XACML which supports a wider
Policy management Data request
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Data user
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XACML*   XACML*
Server Server
XACML*   XACML*
Server Server
Databases Databases
Fig. 6: eXACML framework. XACML* denotes the extended
XACML described in Section 3.
range of access control policies. Usability and scalability are
achieved through a simple client interface and the use of a
proxy server, whose details are described below.
A. Entities
Fig. 6 illustrates the main entities and how they interact
in our framework. Clients consist of data owners who wish
to share and enforce access control on their datasets, and of
data users who are interested in accessing the data. A data
owner can have more than one datasets and a data user can
request access to multiple datasets. Databases are database
servers which manage clients’ datasets. Access to the database
is controlled by at least one instance of XACML* (discussed
below). These servers are likely to be remote and maintained
by a third party (cloud) provider.
Our framework — eXACML — is positioned in between
clients and databases (Fig. 6). Its roles are to mediate their
interactions and to safeguard the databases. Essentially, eX-
ACML is made up of a client interface, a proxy server, cloud
servers and XACML* instances.
• Clients interact with the databases through a local client
interface that parses inputs into request messages and
forwards them to the proxy server. It waits and interprets
response messages before returning them back to the
clients. This interface abstracts out the complexity of
exchanging well-formed messages with the proxy server.
It allows clients to share and query data in an intuitive
manner.
• A cloud server (or server), usually located in the same
machine as the databases, accepts and processes client
requests. We will refer to this component as server.
It manages and responses to meta queries concerning
XACML* instances. For data requests, it forwards them
to the appropriate XACML* instances and sends the
results to the proxy in well-formed messages.
8<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:column-aggregation" FulfillOn = "Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:aggregation-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
avg
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:column-sliding-window" FulfillOn = "Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:sliding-window-start-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">
2011-06-06 00:00:00
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:sliding-window-end-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">
2011-06-07 00:00:00
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:sliding-window-size-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">
5
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:sliding-window-step-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">
5
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:sliding-window-column-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
samplingtime
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
Fig. 4: Obligation portion of the XACML policy for Example II-B
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="exacml:obligation:simple-selection" FulfillOn = "Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="exacml:obligation:selection-id"
DataType = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
longitude >= a1 and longitude <= a2 and latitude >= b2 and latitude <= b1
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
Fig. 5: Obligation portion of the XACML policy for Example II-C
• XACML* is an implementation of the extended XACML
model described in Section 3 (Fig. 3). It processes data
requests (received from the cloud server) by first asking
PDP for the access decision. If permitted, it executes the
obligations, which involves querying the database. The
result is forwarded back to the cloud server.
• Communications between clients and servers go through
a proxy server (or proxy). It processes requests from
clients before forwarding them to the servers, and com-
bines the results into client response messages. As an
example, suppose a request from a data user requires
accessing data from multiple datasets, the proxy first
creates multiple requests and sends to the corresponding
servers. It waits for all the responses from servers, then
combines the results into a single response message for
the data user.
The benefit of having the proxy server is two-fold:
1) Improved performance: Combining data before re-
turning to the users reduces communication costs.
Caching at the proxy can also improve response
time and reduce both computation and communica-
tion costs for the database servers. We demonstrate
this effect in the evaluation section.
2) Additional level of abstraction: The proxy server
acts like a DNS service mapping datasets into to
global, easy-to-remember names, achieving network
data independence, which makes it easier for clients
to manage and query data.
B. Trust and Data Model
We assume cloud severs and the proxy server are honest.
This means that they are trusted to run the correct, latest
eXACML framework. They are also trusted not to violate
data privacy. More specifically, the proxy is trusted not to
tamper with the data received from database servers, and not
to violate data privacy. The only adversaries are rouge clients
who can collude in attempt to gain unauthorized access to the
datasets belonging to honest data owners. We remark that these
assumptions (particularly, that of trusted service providers) are
reasonable since cloud service providers are striving to gain
reputation to run their business, and furthermore have legal
obligations based on Service Level Agreements [23].
We assume that datasets are managed by relational database
systems. For simplicity, each data owner has at most one
dataset. This assumption can be relaxed by virtualizing the
data owner, so that it has multiple identities, each of which
possesses a different dataset.
C. Cloud Model
We now discuss different ways to connect the database,
XACML* and cloud server components. As seen in Fig. 6, the
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Fig. 7: Interaction model of the cloud server, XACML* and
database
number of servers, the number of databases and XACML* in-
stances do not have to match. In particular, multiple databases
may share the same XACML* instance, while a cloud server
may handle multiple XACML* instances.
A server represents a logical, addressable machine to which
the proxy connects. One server can handle requests for mul-
tiple datasets, but we assume each server is connected to one
dataset. This assumption is reasonable since each data owner
has at most one dataset, and it is likely that data owners use
independent virtual machines.
Next, we consider the question of how XACML* in-
stances are shared among databases. At one extreme, a sin-
gle XACML* instance is sufficient to deal with all access
requests. In this case, the servers connect to the the same
XACML* instance, and policies are added to the same PDP.
The PEP has access to multiple databases at different ma-
chines. However, this approach introduces a single point of
failure, and data owners may prefer to have their access
control systems separated from each other. Moreover, extra
layers of authorization is required to prevent rouge clients
from uploading policies associated with datasets of honest
data owners. At the other extreme, the server maintain one
XACML* instance per dataset. Since data requests can be
processed in parallel, this approach could lead to significant
improvement in performance. However, a potential drawback
is the overhead in maintaining a large number of XACML*
instances, especially if many are idle.
When multiple datasets share the same physical machine
(but are in separate virtual machines), it makes more sense
for them to share one XACML* instance. This approach
benefits from the parallelism in processing requests, while
having reduced overhead in maintenance. However, sharing an
XACML* instance experience the same problem with single
point of failure and extra layer of authorization as with a single
XACML* instance.
Considering the above trade-offs, in this paper, we finally
adopted the simple, no-sharing approach, i.e. one server con-
nects to one XACML* that safeguards one database (illustrated
in Fig. 7). This model does not require another layer of
authorization and therefore is easy to implement.
D. One or Multiple Proxies?
Having multiple proxies addresses the trust problem as-
sociated with a single proxy. It could also improve client
throughputs, since requests can be processed in parallel.
However, joining data — one of the proxy’s main features
— across multiple proxies is more complex. Since proxies
also maintain data caches, a mechanism for cache coherence
among distributed servers is also required. Therefore, trade-
offs between efficiency and maintenance overhead must be
carefully considered. Our current framework employs only one
proxy. We defer the protocols with multiple proxies for future
work.
E. Initialization
In the beginning, a data owner creates a database for its
datasets and initializes an XACML* instance at a remote data
server. The XACML* instance starts with an initial policy
specifying who can add and remove data and policies. This
process is done by invoking
{success,fail}
<- initDatabase(host, port, dataID,
databaseType, credentials)
where host, port are the address of the server, dataID
is the unique identifier of the dataset, databaseType is
name of the database management system (MySQL, for exam-
ple), and credentials consists of the data owner’s name,
role and other authentication information for accessing the
server. The client interface wraps these parameters into a
message forwarded to the proxy, then sends it to the specified
server. After authenticating the data owner, the server creates
the database, starts an XACML* instance and connects its
PEP to the database. Finally, the server uploads a root policy
to the newly created XACML* instance. The root policy
specifies that only users with credentials can add new
data, upload new and remove existing policies. This policy
prevents other clients from adding their own policies to this
XACML* instance.
If successful, the proxy creates a new mapping from
dataID to the dataset, as explained next.
F. Data and Policy Management.
Once a database is initialized successfully, it can be identi-
fied uniquely by its dataID. The proxy maintains a mapping
dataID_to_desc, which is a list of:
dataID:<host, port, database name>
All client requests contain dataIDs. The proxy resolves
locations of the dataset using its mapping, before forming
new requests and forwarding them to the appropriate database
servers.
a) Adding and removing data.: To add or remove new
data from a dataset, the data owner invokes
{succses, fail}
<- addData(data file, dataID, credentials)
{success, fail}
<- removeData(remove query, dataID,
credentials)
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where data file contains data to be added to dataID
using the given credentials. remove query is the
query to remove records from the database. The client interface
sends a request to the proxy, which in turn constructs and
forwards a well-formed XACML request together with the file
hash or query hash to the server. The server keeps the hash as
the pending add or pending removal token. Only if the access
control decision is ‘permit’ does the client interface sends
data file or remove query to the server, which verifies
that the content hash matches with the pending add or pending
remove before performing the query. In this protocol, the hash
value is used to prevent other data owners from adding rouge
data or remove unauthorized data.
b) Loading and removing policy. : Every loaded policy is
identified uniquely by its ID of the form dataID:policyID
where policyID is the integer index of the policy. The
XACML* instance maintains an index counter which advances
whenever a new policy is added.
To add or remove a policy, a data owner invokes
{policyID, fail}
<- loadPolicy(policy file, dataID,
credentials)
{success, fail}
<- removePolicy(policyID, dataID,
credentials)
where policy file contains the XACML file to be
uploaded to dataID using the given credentials. The
policy to be removed is identified by the tuple (dataID,
policyID). The client interface forwards a request to
the proxy, which creates a well-formed XACML request
(for loading or removing policy) using dataID and the
credential. Once arrived at the server, the request is
evaluated by the appropriate XACML* instance. Only if the
decision is permit is the policy file added or the policy
dataID:policyID is removed from the corresponding
PDP. In case of policy addition, the new policy ID — the
current index counter’s value — is forwarded back to the data
owner. We assume that policy is small, thus there is no need
for the 2-step protocols as in adding and removing data.
c) Querying policy. : Both data owner and the server
keep track of the policy IDs associated with the dataset. One
can query about the loaded policies for a dataset, using
{{(policyID, description)}, fail}
<- queryPolicy(dataID, credentials}
which returns a set of tuples (policyID,
description) where description is the Description
element of the corresponding policy.
G. Data Request.
A data user issues a request for data through the client
interface. The request may involve accessing multiple datasets.
The data user knows dataIDs, but may not know of the
detailed structure of the datasets.
1) Querying meta data.: A data user can issue a query for
the dataset’s meta data prior to requesting the raw data. Typical
meta data includes table names and schemas. Data owners can
restrict access to such information through a set of policies.
To query meta data, the data user invokes:
{{tableID}, fail}
<- queryTables(dataID, credentials)
{(columnID, type)}, fail}
<- queryColumns(dataID, tableID,
credentials)
The proxy translates the client request into a well-formed,
standard XACML request in which the Action attribute
is set to show_table or show_column respectively.
If the PDP returns a permit decision, the PEP retrieves
and returns the database’s metadata accordingly. The result
for queryTables (if permitted) is a set of tableIDs,
which can later be used in requesting raw data. The result
for queryDataScheme is a set of tuples (columnID,
type) representing the column name and type.
2) Querying data.: Clients can request data by invoking:
{{data record}, {matching policies}, fail}
<- queryData(requested resources,
joining condition)
where
requested resources
= {<credentials, dataId, {columns},
{actions}, {constraints}>}
represents the resources requested from different datasets.
joining condition specifies how the results from those
datasets are joined. These results are returned separately if
joining condition is null. constraints contains
conditions that are applied to the returned data. For example,
columni > θ where columni ∈ {columns} indicates that
the request is only for data whose columni values are greater
than θ. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1) For every requested resource, the proxy creates a well-
formed XACML request using dataId, columns as
Resources and actions as Actions attributes. The
request is then forwarded to the server specified by
dataId.
2) The XACML* instance returns access control decision,
the accompanied data (if decision permitted), and IDs
of the matching policies.
3) The proxy, on receipt of non-empty data, applies con-
ditions specified in contraints. Depending on the
value of joining column, it performs data joining
(discussed next) before sending the final response to the
client.
H. Data Joining.
The joining condition parameter used in
queryData specifies how the results are joined before
returning to the client. In particular:
joining condition ∈ {null, {c1, c2, .., ck}}
where k is the number of requested resources and ci (1 ≤
i ≤ k) are the joining columns of the returned data. When
joining column = null, the proxy forwards what it
receives from the server directly back to the client. Otherwise,
it waits until getting data from all requested servers, then
constructs a client response by joining the results using normal
database join operations.
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I. Conflict Resolution.
It is possible for clients to receive empty data for their
requests, especially when the requests involve more than one
datasets. This arises because different policies associated with
different datasets are enforced. We refer to this as policy
conflict, which happens in one of the two cases:
1) There is at least one policy that denies the client’s access.
2) All policies permit access, but the joined data still results
in an empty set. For example, one policy allows access to
data where columni > θ whereas another policy allows
access to data where columni ≤ θ. Another example is
when two policies specify different sliding windows, as
a consequence the joining columns do not have values
in common.
We provide a simple mechanism for dealing with policy
conflict. Responses from queryData includes IDs of the
matching policies. When conflict occurs, the client is aware of
the cause and is able to contact the dataset owner to resolve the
conflict. We assume that such resolution is done out-of-band
and is not within the scope of the framework.
J. Caching.
The proxy maintains a cache of data received from the
servers. Since operations in the cloud server are slow, espe-
cially when involving database access, caching can improve
the response time. It is also reasonable to expect a cache-
friendly request pattern from clients, as popular data are
frequently requested.
We consider a simple design, in which data cache is the
map <request>:<data> where request is the XACML
request with the corresponding data.
• Cache replacement: when full, an old entry is evicted in
a random fashion.
• Cache coherence: stale entries can lead to security vio-
lation. For instance, a new policy update denies a client
access to a dataset, but the cache contains data of previous
access which will be served by the proxy at the client’s
next request. We address this problem by simply purging
entire cache every time a policy is loaded or removed.
V. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
A. Prototype
We have implemented a prototype of eXACML, which
consists of over 3400 lines of Java code. Database accesses
are provided by JDBC API, while communications between
clients, proxy and servers are done through Socket inter-
face. For XACML*, we extended Sun’s XACML implemen-
tation [28] — an open source, Java project that supports
XACML 2.0 standard. We instrumented its PEP module to
handle more obligations (Section 3). The prototype supports
all the features discussed in the previous section: a client is
able to load, remove, query data and policies.
Our prototype provides an easy-to-use graphical interface
for querying and managing data. A query form (Fig. 8b)
takes in user credentials and requests. A response from the
server includes the data server information, matching policies
(a) Data view
(b) Query form
Fig. 8: User interface for querying data
(a) Policy view
(b) Policy upload
Fig. 9: User interface for managing access control policies.
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and the data (if applicable), which are displayed in the data
view window (Fig. 8a). Policies are updated and queried using
similar GUI, as shown in Fig. 9.
B. Evaluation
We evaluated our prototype’s performance, and its ability
to support dynamic, fine-grained access control policies. The
system performance is measured by the time taken to ful-
fill user requests. We compare our prototype’s performance
against that of a system that executes the requests directly,
i.e. without the access control layer. We refer to the later as
direct-query system.
1) Methodologies. :
a) Setup.: We emulate a cloud-like environment running
our prototype, as shown in Fig. 6. More specifically, we make
use of four machines, two running servers, on running the
proxy and the other represents a client. The machines belong
to the PDCC cluster3, each has one Xeon processor 3.0Ghz,
running OCS5.1 (2.6.18-53El5smp) operating system with
4GB of RAM. The machines are connected via InfiniBand
20Gbps.
The servers maintain two databases: a weather database
and a traffic database. The former contains four tables with
real data taken from four different weather stations collected
in a 5-day duration and with one-minute sampling interval.
We synthesize the traffic database with two tables containing
records of traffic volume and vehicle speed that match with
the weather datasets.
b) Workloads.: We generate synthetic workloads that
include large numbers of policies and requests. Since our
prototype is compared against a direct-query system, the work-
loads also contain a large number of direct database queries,
each corresponds to a request in our prototype. A direct query
is forwarded to the server, which executes and returns the same
data as when executing the corresponding request in our sys-
tem. The parameters used in generating workloads are shown
in Table. VI. The workloads and source code for generating
them can be found at http://sands.sce.ntu.edu.sg/trac/exacml/
First, we use nDirectQueries and directQueryDist to
create a set DQuery of direct queries of five different
types: selection, approximation, aggregation, sliding window
and data joining. The first three types are ordinary database
SELECT query, which is forwarded by the server directly to
the database engine. Sliding window queries are first converted
into multiple SELECT queries, one for every window, which
are then sent to the database engine. Data joining queries
contain two sub-queries (of the other four types) chosen at
random and for different data servers. Each data server pro-
cesses and returns the result independently. Next, nPolicies
unique XACML policies are generated, each with different
exacml.subject:role-id. Every policy corresponds to
a direct query whose type is either selection, approximation,
aggregation or sliding window. Therefore, the set of policy
obligations and DQuery represent the same set of SELECT
queries to be executed by the database engines.
3http://pdcc.ntu.edu.sg/content/128-cores-linux-cluster-pdccsce
Next, we generate a set of requests. For every policy, we
construct one matching and one non-matching request. The
matching request contains credentials, resources and actions
as specified in the policy. For the non-matching request, we
use a different
exacml:rdbms-database-id from the weather and traf-
fic database names. For each data joining direct query, we
create corresponding (matching and non-matching) requests
made up of two sub-requests. Each sub-requests from the
matching request corresponds to a sub-query in the data
joining direct query. In summary, a matching request executed
in our prototype returns the same data as the corresponding
query evaluated in the direct-query system.
Finally, we create a workload of nRequests requests fol-
lowing Zipf distribution with skew parameter α. This workload
models a realistic use of the prototype, in which a small
number of popular data are requested frequently. Such request
pattern is found in many other systems, such as P2P file-
sharing and web caching [3], [16]. We select maxRank
unique queries from DQueries at random, then assign them
with random ranks. A sequence of queries is generated from
the selected set with Zipf distribution, using α = 0.223 (as in
[16]). For every direct query, this workload also contains the
corresponding policy, matching and non-matching request.
2) Metrics.: In the following experiments, we investigate
our prototype’s effectiveness in granting data access to au-
thorized requests and denying unauthorized ones. We also
measure its performance in terms of the time taken to fulfill
authorized data requests. This is compared against the direct-
query system, i.e. one without eXACML. We also provide
quantitative analysis of the proxy, especially its caching and
data joining features.
3) Experiments and Results.: We first load nPolicies
unique policies onto the data server. The measured time is
reasonably small, with mean of 0.034s and standard deviation
of 0.016 per loading operation.
We then run two sets of experiments:
1) The workload consisting of nDirectQueries unique
queries and the corresponding unique requests. We en-
able the data joining option at the proxy in the first run,
and disable it in the second. To disable cache, we simply
change the proxy configuration file. To run without the
joining option, we re-generate the workload without data
joining queries and requests. We measure the time taken
to fulfill direct queries and data requests.
2) The workload contains nRequests queries and the cor-
responding requests, which follow the Zipf distribution.
In both experiments, non-matching requests are denied
access. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 compare the performance of our
prototype against direct-query system, using measurements
of matching requests. In both figures, there is a number of
requests taking over 5s to finish. They are sliding window
requests, which translates into a large number of SELECT
queries to be executed by the database engines. That the server
needs to wait and aggregate the results into a single client
message, and that JDBC implementation incurs non-significant
overhead for executing a SELECT query both contribute to the
noticeable delay.
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Variable Value Description
nDirectQueries 1000 number of direct queries
directQueryDist 248:248:248:156:100 distribution of direct queries
(selection:approximation:aggregation:sliding
window:joining request)
nPolicies 900 number of unique policies
nRequests 1500 number of matching requests
α 0.223 skew parameter for Zipf distribution
maxRank 300 maximum rank of unique requests from
which Zipf distribution is generated
TABLE VI: Summary of parameters used in setting up experiments
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Fig. 11: Overall performance with exacmlXACML when the
joining and caching options are disabled
Fig. 10 illustrates eXACML’s overhead when both caching
and data joining options at the proxy are enabled. For unique
queries and requests, there is no overhead from the 99th
percentile. 80% of the requests incurs less than 10% overhead.
The largest overhead is less than 0.4s and is observed from
between 87% to 90% percentile. An interesting pattern in
which eXACML outperforms the direct-query system can be
seen at lower percentiles. Besides network and computational
variations, this can be attributed to the data joining feature at
the proxy (discussed later). For requests and queries following
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Fig. 12: Benefit of caching on performance. Queries follow
Zipf distribution
Zipf distribution, eXACML performs better most of the time
(up until the 89th percentile). This is thanks to the caching
mechanism at the proxy, whose benefit will be analyzed in
more detail later.
Fig. 11 shows how the overhead changes when the proxy
performs neither caching nor data joining. The overhead is
more discernible: for unique requests, the overhead starts from
20th percentile, as compared to 45th percentile in Fig. 10.
Similarly, for queries following Zipf distribution, the overhead
is seen from 10th percentile, as compared to 89th percentile in
Fig. 10. This implies that caching and data joining at the proxy
are most effective when the query distribution is heavy-tailed.
We proceed to analyze benefits of caching at the proxy.
Request times for Zipf-distribution queries with and without
cache are extracted from the experiments and plotted in
Fig. 12. We show the results with and without data joining
queries. In both cases, caching results in better performance.
By itself, i.e. without the joining data feature, caching leads
to 50% improvement for more than 80% of the requests. For
the workload including data joining queries, a similar pattern
can be seen, although the improvement is not as noticeable.
Finally, we analyze the benefit of the data joining feature at
the proxy. We run the same experiments as before, but with
workloads consisting of only data joining queries and requests.
The results shown in Fig. 13 are for both unique and Zipf-
distribution requests. It can be seen that eXACML outperforms
the direct-query system up until 65th percentile for unique
queries and 70th percentile for Zipf-distribution queries. This
is because for most requests, eXACML helps reducing the
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data size substantially (by joining the results from two servers)
before transferring it back to the client. In contrast, without
eXACML, the client has to wait for all data to come back
individually before performing joining by itself. Notice that
some requests in eXACML still experience longer delay (after
70th percentile), because extra communication between client
and proxy (as opposed to the direct communication between
client and server) and computation overhead at the proxy are
not fully discounted.
VI. RELATED WORK
There exists cloud-based systems that enable data sharing
from multiple sources. SenseWeb [26], SensorBase [10] are
examples of cloud services that let users upload and share
their sensor data. They support coarse-grained access control
model in which an user either makes its dataset public, shares
it with a list of collaborators or keeps it private. Similarly,
Google’s Fusion Table [14] allows user to upload generic data
and to perform simple analysis such as data visualization on
the cloud. Recently, companies such as Okta [22] have started
implementing cloud-brokerage models that provide centralized
service for management of enterprises’ resources, including
access control. However, these access control model is also
coarse-grained, which means it cannot deal with the access
scenarios we consider in this paper. In addition, data owners
in these systems upload their datasets onto a centralized
cloud, whereas our work does not make such assumption
(we consider multi-cloud environment in which different data
owner uses its own cloud provider).
There are also numerous works focusing on access control
and data privacy on the cloud. Airavat [27], for example,
assumes the cloud is trusted in enforcing access control. It
uses a simple mandatory access control system available in
SELinux [1], and provides a trusted environment for exe-
cuting MapReduce [11] jobs while guaranteeing differential
privacy [12]. Our work makes the same assumption about
clouds’ trustworthiness, but aims at improving the access con-
trol aspect of the system, which is complementary to Airavat.
Other works [29], [15], [23] assume the cloud is untrusted
and employ cryptographic approach for access control. In [29],
data is encrypted with attribute-based encryption [13], [7] by
a proxy using a proxy re-encryption technique. Embedded
in the ciphertext are conditions that must be met when
decrypting. Plustus and CloudProof [15], [23] use broadcast
encryption [19] to protect the data, while key management [15]
is done using key rolling and lazy revocation techniques.
These cryptographic approaches provide strong guarantees
for data security, but they cannot express fine-grained access
control policies as described in our work. Thus the focus in
these works is also complimentary to ours. In addition, key
management and revocation protocols are complex and incur
much overhead in such an untrusted environment.
Multiple policies matching in XACML is usually resolved
by the top-level policy combining algorithms. XACML sup-
ports only a limited number of combining algorithms. Ninghui
et al. [20] and Rao et al. [25] propose a formal language for ex-
pressing more fine-grained policy composition. The language
can deal with evaluation errors and combining of obligations.
Mazolleni et al. [17] propose a method for combining policies
based on their similarity and users’ preferences.
Time-series data — similar to those considered in our paper
— could arrive at the system in continuous streams, for which
relational databases such as MySQL and Postgresql are not
ideal. Aurora [2] is a popular data stream management system
that addresses limitations of relational databases when it comes
to stream data. Carminati et al. [9], [8] are among the first
to propose a model and implementation of access control for
data streams based on Aurora. The model supports four access
scenarios: column-based, value-based, general window and
sliding window. Our framework supports all of these scenarios
for on-demand queries over archival databases. The extension
to eXACML that deals with continuous queries over stream
databases is left for future work.
VII. FUTURE WORK
We have implemented a simple prototype and carried out
preliminary evaluation of our framework. The next step would
be to improve the prototype and perform more comprehensive
evaluations. More specifically, the cloud-like environment set
up in the experiment contains only two data servers. In
addition, only one dataset comes from real monitoring stations,
and the workloads are synthetic. Therefore, we plan to acquire
more realistic datasets and workloads, and to evaluate the
prototype with larger numbers of data servers. We also plan
to export our prototype into real cloud environments such as
Amazon EC2 and Microsoft’s Azure [4], [18], and benchmark
it with real data mining applications accessing real datasets.
We assumed that each dataset is guarded by an independent
XACML* instance. We have acknowledged the trade-offs
in having multiple datasets sharing one XACML* instance,
especially when datasets reside in the same physical machine.
Another trade-off is the number of proxy servers. It would be
interesting to investigate these trade-offs further by extending
the framework with XACML* sharing and distributed proxies.
As shown in Table I, eXACML only deals with archival
databases and queries. The immediate extension will be to
15
support stream databases and continuous queries. Relational
databases are not the best tool for handling stream data,
for which other models have been proposed [2]. We will
examine the design and compare performance of the extended
eXACML to that of the existing works on access control for
stream data [9], [8].
Regarding data sharing, access control only addresses the
problem of authorization. We have so far made an assumption
that authentication is implicit, that is, clients are given static
credentials and the servers always accept the given credentials.
We plan to incorporate an authentication model into our
framework. It is an interesting challenge in decentralized
settings, of which our multi-cloud scenario is an example,
since authentication may depend not only on static credentials
but also on previous interactions between parties and the states
of the entire system. Authentication is also an important when
the cloud provider has to log and notify data owners of access
to their data (for billing purposes, for example). We plan
to use other access control languages such as DynPal [6]
or SecPal [5], because they are more suitable for handling
dynamic authentication than XACML.
Finally, we have always assumed the cloud is trusted in
enforcing access control policies and not to violate user’s data
security and privacy. However, users with sensitive data or data
that have been expensive to collect will demand highest level
of security. As a consequence, they cannot assume the cloud
is trusted in handling their data. Existing works have taken
the cryptographic approach that encrypt data and attempts
to outsource the key management to the cloud. Nevertheless,
the range of access control policies supported by the existing
systems has been limited. For future work, we aim to find
practical cryptographic protocols that can handle more fine-
grained access control scenarios. Since eXACML contains two
components belonging to third parties: the proxy server and the
cloud servers, we will investigate relaxing the trust assumption
for these components one by one.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a framework (eXACML)
that allows users to share their data on the cloud in a secure,
flexible, easy-to-use and scalable manner. We considered a
trusted cloud environment, in which data are maintained in
relational databases. The cloud environment makes it easy for
data owners to share and benefit from mining the aggregated
data. The main challenge is how to let users control access
to their data in most flexible ways. We achieved security
and flexibility by extending the XACML framework, allowing
users to specify fine-grained access control policies. Our
framework contains a proxy server residing in between clients
and the cloud servers. It processes requests from the clients,
joins and caches responses from the servers before sending
back to the client. We have implemented a prototype and
carried out preliminary experiments to evaluate its perfor-
mance. The results suggested that the framework is scalable,
as the overhead incurred is small, thanks to the caching and
data joining features at the proxy. In addition, the prototype
provides a graphical user interface that lets users share and
manage their data in an easy-to-use manner.
We believe that in order to take full advantage of cloud
computing, having a framework such as ours is very important.
Our paper has taken the first steps towards realizing a practical
and usable sharing-friendly cloud environment. We have also
identified many avenues for future work, such as improving
scalability with more proxies, adding support for stream data
and other policy languages, and relaxing assumptions on the
trustworthiness of the cloud.
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